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This paper uses a unique data set of monthly new vehicle sales by detailed model from 1978-
2007, and implements a new identification strategy to estimate the effect of the price of gasoline 
on consumer demand for fuel economy. We control for unobserved vehicle and consumer 
characteristics by using within model-year changes in the price of gasoline and vehicle sales. We 
find a significant demand response, as nearly half of the decline in market share of U.S. 
manufacturers from 2002-2007 was due to the increase in the price of gasoline. On the other 
hand, an increase in the gasoline tax would only modestly affect average fuel economy. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The rapid rise in the price of gasoline from just over $1 per gallon at the beginning of 2002 to 
over $4 per gallon by mid 2008 has renewed interest in the relationship between the price of 
gasoline and the demand for fuel economy in the U.S. market. Recent research on oil prices and 
economic activity suggests that because of improved energy efficiency, the U.S. economy as a 
whole is currently less sensitive to oil prices than it was prior to the 1970s oil shocks (Hooker, 
1996 and Linn, 2008). In contrast, the accelerating decline of the Detroit carmakers’ market 
share between 2005 and 2008 suggests that vehicle producers may remain quite sensitive to oil 
and gasoline prices. 
Many industry analysts and the popular press have noted the large decrease in sales for U.S. 
automakers and large SUVs between 2002 and 2007, and have widely attributed some of the 
changes to the coinciding increase in the price of gasoline. Figure 1 depicts these trends, showing 
a 20 percent decrease in the market share of U.S. firms between 2002 and 2007, which represents 
several billion dollars per year in lost profits.
1 The figure also suggests that some of the decrease 
in sales by U.S. firms can be attributed to changes in the SUV segment of the market. At the 
beginning of this time period, U.S. firms accounted for 80 percent of sales of large SUVs (with a 
mean fuel economy of 16.6 miles per gallon, MPG), but only 37 percent of sales of smaller 
SUVs (commonly called crossover utility vehicles, with a mean fuel economy of 22.2 MPG). As 
the retail price of gasoline nearly doubled, the market share of small SUVs increased while the 
market share of large SUVs decreased. Although the contemporaneous correlations between the 
price of gasoline and market shares are suggestive, it needs to be recalled that fuel costs are only 
                                                 
1 The market share of U.S. automakers has been declining since the mid 1950s. After stabilizing for most of the 
1980s and the early 1990s, it started declining again in 1997 (Klier, 2009).   3
a fraction of the total cost of any vehicle, and that many other factors could explain these trends. 
In fact, despite the attention given to the price of gasoline by the press, analysis of the extent to 
which increases in the price of gasoline adversely affect U.S. automakers has so far been limited.  
The effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand is also central to the ongoing 
policy debate over reducing gasoline consumption, which has emanated from concerns about 
global warming and reducing oil imports.
2 In 2007, Congress passed legislation that increased 
the corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standard by about 40 percent to 35 MPG, to be 
effective by model-year 2020. During the Congressional debate over the bill, several members of 
Congress advocated increasing the gasoline tax or introducing a carbon tax as alternative means 
of reducing gasoline consumption.
3 A comparison of the welfare effects of imposing a stricter 
CAFE standard and raising the gasoline tax (see Parry and Small, 2005, for the optimal gasoline 
tax) depends partly on the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy (Austin 
and Dinan, 2005). 
Whether the price of gasoline influences new vehicle demand in an economically significant 
fashion remains an open question. Most previous studies analyze how the price of gasoline 
affects the average fuel economy of new vehicles sold, but do not provide insight into the causes 
of the patterns depicted in Figure 1. Furthermore, as discussed in more detail below, earlier 
studies do not control for both unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics. Finally, 
reported estimates have varied widely across studies.  
                                                 
2 See, for example, hearings at the House Energy and Commerce committee on March 14, 2007. 
3 During the summer of 2007, Congressman Dingell (MI) proposed a tax increase of 50 cents per gallon (Timiraos, 
2007). During the spring of 2009 the Obama Administration moved forward the time by which the tighter fuel 
economy requirements must be met from model-year 2020 to model-year 2016. Greenhouse gas regulation has been 
added to the determination of the standard, which raises the fuel economy requirement to 35.5 MPG (Foster and 
Klier, 2009).   4
In this paper, we estimate the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy. 
We use a unique data set of monthly sales by vehicle model that spans 30 years. The data are 
disaggregated and of high-frequency, allowing for a simple and transparent empirical strategy 
that controls for unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics. We find that the price of 
gasoline significantly affects the new vehicles market. Specifically, the increase in the price of 
gasoline from 2002-2007 explains nearly half of the decrease in the market share of U.S. firms. 
Furthermore, according to our estimates, a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline would 
modestly increase the average fuel economy of vehicles sold, by 0.5-1 MPG.   
We now discuss our empirical strategy and the relationship of the paper to the previous 
literature in more detail. Past research has generally not accounted for the potential correlation 
between the price of gasoline and unobserved consumer and vehicle characteristics. Many 
studies rely primarily on cross-sectional variation in the price of gasoline (e.g., Goldberg, 1998, 
West, 2004 and Bento et al., 2006), and thus depend on the questionable assumption that the 
price is uncorrelated with unobserved consumer preferences (Chouinard and Perloff, 2007); for 
example, it is assumed that environmentalists are no more likely to live in states with high 
gasoline taxes.
4 The failure to account for unobservables is particularly problematic because the 
direction of the resulting bias cannot be determined from economic theory; unobserved vehicle 
and consumer characteristics may be positively or negatively correlated with the price of 
gasoline. An additional limitation of the cross-sectional analysis is that it yields an estimate of 
the relationship between the price of gasoline and consumer demand only for a particular point in 
time. Recent estimates of the elasticity of gasoline consumption with respect to the price of 
                                                 
4 An earlier empirical literature estimated the effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand in the 1970s (see 
Tardiff, 1980, for a summary). These studies have similar limitations to the more recent ones, however. For 
example, Boyd and Mellman (1980) find a large effect on demand using cross-sectional variation in vehicle 
characteristics and prices, but the study does not control for unobserved characteristics.   5
gasoline (e.g., Hughes et al., 2008) suggest that it has decreased in magnitude since the 1970s. 
However, it is not known whether the effect of the price of gasoline on new vehicle demand has 
changed as well. 
Furthermore, studies that employ time series methods (e.g., Small and Van Dender, 2007) 
only partially address these issues as they use market-level fuel economy measures and therefore 
do not control for unobserved characteristics at the vehicle level, such as weight and power, 
which are highly correlated with fuel economy. Finally, many earlier studies analyze consumer 
choices only among broad vehicle classes, such as small and large cars. Their results cannot be 
used to assess the effect of the price of gasoline on market shares of specific market segments, 
such as SUVs. 
This paper makes several advances beyond the existing literature. First, we use a unique data 
set and empirical strategy. The data include monthly national dealer sales by detailed vehicle 
model from 1978-2007. As Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) argue, when using market-level 
data it is necessary to account for the potential correlation between vehicle prices, sales and 
unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics. The monthly frequency of the sales data allows 
for a simple linear estimating equation that controls for these unobserved variables. Our 
empirical strategy derives from the details of automobile production, specifically the fact that 
unobserved vehicle characteristics do not vary over the model-year, and that consumer tastes are 
likely to be slow-moving and uncorrelated with monthly variation of the price of gasoline. The 
empirical specification exploits within model-year changes in the monthly gasoline price and 
vehicle sales, while controlling for unobserved characteristics.  
The second contribution of this paper is that the sample period and unit of analysis allow us 
to investigate a number of questions about the price of gasoline and consumer demand that have   6
not been the focus of previous work. Access to data at the vehicle model level allows us to 
investigate the causes of recent market trends shown in Figure 1. In addition, we use a 30-year 
panel to consider whether the relationship between the price of gasoline and new vehicle demand 
has changed over time. By comparison, Busse et al. (2005, 2009) use a similar identification 
strategy but analyze a much shorter time frame. 
The main results are reported in Section 5. We find that the increase in the price of gasoline 
between 2002 and 2007 explains nearly half of the decrease in market share of large SUVs but 
little of the increase in market share of small SUVs. Furthermore, the price increase explains 
nearly half of the decrease in the market share of U.S. manufacturers. Thus, the results indicate 
that the price of gasoline has a significant effect on the new vehicles market, but we find this 
relationship to be smaller in magnitude than is often suggested. We estimate the elasticity of 
average new vehicle fuel economy with respect to the price of gasoline to be 0.12, about half the 
elasticity reported in Austin and Dinan (2005). Our estimate implies that a one dollar increase in 
the price of gasoline raises average fuel economy by 0.5-1 MPG. 
A caveat should be noted regarding these results. Like much of the previous literature on the 
price of gasoline and new vehicle demand, our estimates represent a short run relationship. It is 
possible that the long run response is greater, for example, if firms reorganize production at 
assembly plants across model-years in response to a permanent price change. Because our data 
and empirical strategy do not allow us to investigate this possibility, we treat the estimates as a 
lower bound to the response of vehicle demand to the price of gasoline. That is, our results 
quantify a short run demand response, which previously has not been demonstrated clearly. 
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2 ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ON NEW VEHICLE DEMAND 
2.1 EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
This section describes the empirical strategy for estimating the effect of the price of gasoline on 
the demand for fuel economy. Motivated by the two questions discussed in the introduction, the 
causes of recent changes in market shares and the effect of the gasoline tax on average fuel 
economy, we are primarily interested in estimating the equilibrium effect of the price of gasoline 
on market shares of new vehicle models.  
We begin with the following linear approximation to the reduced form relationship between 
vehicle characteristics, consumer characteristics and sales:
5 
jt jt jt jt jt X f q ν ξ β α + + + = ln ,          ( 1 )  
where jt q  is the sales of vehicle model j at timet, jt f  is expected fuel costs, jt X is a vector of 
other observed model characteristics, jt ξ is a scalar representing the total effect of unobserved 
characteristics on sales, jt ν is a scalar that represents the total effect of consumer characteristics 
on sales, and α andβ are coefficients.  
Expected fuel costs depend on the expected gasoline price over the life of the vehicle, 
expected miles traveled and the fuel economy of the vehicle. Observed characteristics 
in jt X include variables such as weight, length and horsepower. Unobserved characteristics 
include all other aspects of the vehicle, including physical features (e.g., the presence or absence 
of a sunroof), as well as intangibles (e.g., handling). The consumer characteristics variable, jt ν , 
                                                 
5 Equation (1) could be derived from a discrete choice model with the appropriate assumptions on the error term and 
vehicle prices (Berry, 1994). We begin with equation (1) rather than the underlying utility model because we are 
only interested in the effect of the price of gasoline on equilibrium sales and not on welfare effects.   8
accounts for the effect of heterogeneous consumer preferences on sales, for example, if wealthy 
consumers are more likely to purchase certain vehicle models than other consumers.
6  
 
2.2   MODEL SPECIFICATION AND IDENTIFICATION 
The existence of unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics presents major challenges to 
estimating equation (1). Regressing sales on fuel costs would yield biased estimates if expected 
fuel costs are correlated either with unobserved vehicle or consumer characteristics. Both 
situations are particularly likely to occur. Vehicles with high fuel economy have low fuel costs, 
but are also likely to have less cabin and trunk space, both of which are unobserved. The 
variable jt ν depends on the distribution of characteristics of consumers who purchase a vehicle in 
time periodt. The variable may be correlated with fuel costs, for example, if environmentalists 
tend to live in regions with a high price of gasoline. Previous work largely avoids these issues by 
assuming either that fuel costs are uncorrelated with other vehicle characteristics (e.g., BLP) or 
that the price of gasoline is uncorrelated with consumer characteristics across geographic 
markets (e.g., West, 2004). 
We next discuss how we account for unobserved vehicle and consumer characteristics. For 
most vehicle production lines, the model year begins in mid-August after a brief, one- or two-
week, shutdown period. During that shutdown, which separates vehicle model-years, the 
manufacturer may change the vehicle’s characteristics such as its engine size. In practice, 
changes across model-years range from very minor to a complete overhaul. Once production 
begins, however, the features of a vehicle are constant over the model-year; a 2005 Honda Civic 
purchased in September of 2004 is physically the same as a 2005 Civic purchased in May of 
                                                 
6 Consumer heterogeneity could also cause the coefficientsα andβ  to vary over time and across models. Section 
5.1 addresses this possibility.    9
2005. On the other hand, expected fuel costs depend on the expected price of gasoline, miles 
traveled as well as the fuel economy of the vehicle. Changes in the expected gasoline price cause 
expected fuel costs to vary. We therefore define a model-year specific 
intercept: ij jt jt jy X ν ξ β φ + + ≡ . The intercept absorbs both observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the vehicle other than expected fuel costs. It also includes the mean consumer 
characteristics over the model-year. 
Substituting jy φ into equation (1) yields:  
jt jy jt jt f q ε φ α + + = ln ,           ( 2 )  
where jt ε is a residual that includes the effect of deviations from the mean in consumer 
characteristics. 
We now turn to unobserved consumer characteristics. Specifically, consider the distribution 
of the characteristics of consumers who enter the market, i.e., who purchase a vehicle at timet. 
For a given month, we consider two examples of deviations from the mean of the distribution in 
a particular month: 1) more consumers of all types enter the market; and 2) more families with 
multiple children enter the market. The first case would affect all vehicle sales proportionately, 
which can be addressed by adding time dummies to equation (2):  
jt t jy jt jt f q ε τ φ α + + + = ln .           ( 3 )  
The second case might affect vehicle models disproportionately. The maintained assumption is 
that within model-year changes in expected fuel costs are exogenous to changes in the 
distribution of consumer characteristics that disproportionately affect sales. This assumption is 
discussed in more detail below.  

















= .          ( 4 )  
Expected fuel costs in periodsequal the number of miles driven, s M , multiplied by the cost of 
driving one mile, jy
g
s MPG P / , where
g
s P is the expected price of gasoline in periodsand jy MPG is 
fuel economy in MPG. Total expected fuel costs, jt f , equal total discounted expected fuel costs, 
with a discount rate of r and a vehicle life ofT periods. 
We assume that the price of gasoline follows a random walk, so that the expected price at any 
time t s > is equal to the price at timet. As a result, the expected cost of driving a specific model 
is proportional to the current price of gasoline, divided by the vehicle’s fuel economy. 







q ε τ φ α + + + = ln .          ( 5 )  
The dependent variable is the log sales of model j in montht. The first independent variable, 
referred to as dollars-per-mile, is the expected cost of driving the vehicle one mile at the time of 
purchase;
g
t P is the seasonally adjusted price of gasoline; and jy MPG is the fuel economy of 
model j in model-year y .
7 Section 4 describes the details of the variable construction. 
The coefficient of interest isα , which is proportional to the effect on log sales of the cost of 
driving one mile. The parameterα is identified by time-series variation of the price of gasoline 
and cross-sectional variation of fuel economy. In particular, a within model-year change in the 
price of gasoline differentially affects expected driving costs across models. When the expected 
                                                 
7 Note that α is proportional to miles driven, which is defined as the number of miles driven per year, conditional on 
vehicle choice. The price of gasoline may affect miles driven, but consumers can account for this effect when 
making their purchase decisions. Consequently, α includes the indirect effect of the price of gasoline on sales via 
miles driven.   11
price increases, the fuel costs of a vehicle with high fuel economy increase by less than the costs 
of a “gas guzzler”.   
In addition to the monthly gasoline price variation, the inclusion of model-year intercepts is 
central to our empirical strategy. The model-year intercepts account for the potentially 
endogenous relationship among vehicle characteristics. Note that equation (5) includes the 
assumptions that there are no income effects and thatα is constant over time and across models, 
but these assumptions are relaxed below.
 
The identifying assumption is that within model-year changes in dollars-per-mile are 
exogenous to other determinants of sales, including consumer preferences. Recent evidence from 
the new vehicles market suggests that consumer characteristics in equation (1) vary over the 
model-year. Copeland et al. (2005) and Corrado et al. (2006) have documented that transaction 
prices (the prices paid by the consumer, as distinct from the manufacturer suggested retail price, 
MSRP) vary substantially within the model-year. Prices decline dramatically over the course of 
the model-year, and sales follow a “hump-shaped” pattern, peaking in the early summer. 
Furthermore, sales and price profiles vary across market segments (e.g., compact cars), and many 
manufacturers have recently introduced incentives for specific models (Busse et al., 2007). In the 
reduced form approach used in this paper, the variable jt ν in equation (1) includes changes in 
consumer characteristics that cause changes in transaction prices; we therefore assume that 
dollars-per-mile is exogenous to consumer characteristics and, thus, to transaction prices. The 
high frequency sales data allow us to control for slow-moving changes in consumer preferences 
or other factors; section 5.2 provides evidence in support of the exogeneity assumption. 
 
   12
2.3 INTERPRETATION OFα  
The two motivations for estimatingα are to address how much of the changes in market shares in 
Figure 1 are due to the increase in the price of gasoline, and to estimate the effect of changes in 
the gasoline tax on average fuel economy. For example, to calculate the effect of an increase in 
the price of gasoline on SUV market shares, we use equation (5) to compute counterfactual 
market shares in 2007 using the price of gasoline in 2002; the effect of the price increase can be 
inferred from the differences between actual and counterfactual market shares.  
The parameterα describes the reduced form relationship between dollars-per-mile and sales, 
which can be illustrated by considering the example of an unexpected and permanent increase in 
the price of gasoline. The first effect of the price increase is that because of the reduction in 
disposable income, some consumers who would have purchased new vehicles decide not to 
purchase new vehicles. The demand curve for each new vehicle model would shift in. Assume, 
for the moment, that there is a proportional shift for all models; in that case, the time dummies in 
equation (5) would control for the inward shift. The second effect is that the expected fuel costs 
of all vehicles increase, but by less for vehicles with high fuel economy. Consequently, ifα is 
negative, the demand curve of all vehicles would shift in by an additional amount, but by less for 
vehicles with high fuel economy. In sum, the time dummies control for the average effect of the 
price of gasoline on sales, andα is identified by deviations of sales relative to the mean. A 
negative value implies that when the price of gasoline increases, sales and market shares of 
vehicles with high fuel economy increase compared to vehicles with low fuel economy; the 
estimate ofα is independent of the average effect of the gasoline price increase, which is 
absorbed by the time dummies.    13
An additional effect of a gasoline price increase is that firms may increase the relative price 
of vehicles with high fuel economy. Thus, the price of gasoline may affect new vehicle prices 
(see Langer and Miller, 2008, for evidence on prices), but because our interest lies in the reduced 
form relationship between dollars-per-mile and sales, it is not necessary to estimate the effect on 
vehicle prices. 
The previous example assumed that the first effect is proportional for all vehicles. Jacobsen 
(2008) finds considerable evidence for substitution between new and used vehicles, which 
suggests that the first effect may be greater for some vehicles than for others. However, Section 
5.2 suggests that dollars-per-mile is uncorrelated with substitution from new to used vehicles.  
The final issue regarding the interpretation ofα  is that because the monthly price of gasoline 
and vehicle sales are used in the estimation, the estimate ofα corresponds to a short-run effect of 
the price of gasoline on sales. In response to a permanent change in the price of gasoline, vehicle 
manufacturers and dealers might adjust behavior in different ways (see Bresnahan and Ramey, 
1993, and Copeland and Hall, 2005, on production and pricing decisions in the short and long 
run). For example, following a gasoline price increase, manufacturers could redesign vehicles to 
achieve higher fuel economy. It is uncertain, a priori, how much different in magnitude the short 
and long run responses might be; if dealer and manufacturer inventories are large, the difference 
could be small.  
Given the data and identification strategy used in this paper, it is not possible to directly 
estimate the long run effect of the price of gasoline on sales. In specifications of equation (5) that 
include lags of dollars-per-mile and lags of the dependent variable, the coefficients on the lags 
are small and not statistically significant (not reported, but available upon request). However, 
these results are merely suggestive. We view the baseline estimate ofα  as representing the short-  14
run effect, and likely a lower bound to the long run effect. Thus, our empirical strategy is used to 
demonstrate a robust consumer response to a change in the price of gasoline, something that had 
not been previously shown in the literature.  
 
3 DATA 
The real price of gasoline is constructed using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 
monthly consumer price index (CPI) and the price of regular unleaded gasoline from September, 
1977-August, 2007. The real price of gasoline,
g
t P , is the price of gasoline divided by the CPI, 
with the CPI normalized to one in April of 2008. The price of gasoline is seasonally adjusted 
using X-12 ARIMA, which is the same model used by the Census Bureau. 
Total dealer sales by vehicle model are constructed from weekly publications of Wards 
Automotive Reports (1978-1979) and Ward’s AutoInfoBank (1980-2007). Note that the 1970s 
sales data do not include light trucks or imports.
8  
The monthly sales data, which span model-year 1978 through model-year 2007 (i.e., 
September, 1977 through August, 2007), are merged to EPA fuel economy data for the 
corresponding model-year.
9 Fuel economy is not available prior to the 1978 model-year, which 
                                                 
8 In principle, the expansion of the sample in 1980 makes it harder to compare results from the 1970s with later 
years. We prefer to include the data from 1978 and 1979 to include the second major oil shock. It should be noted 
that in later years the results are similar for cars as for light trucks, so the expanded sample is probably not a major 
concern. 
9 The match is not straightforward because the two data sets are reported at different levels of aggregation. Vehicle 
characteristics data are reported at the “trim level” to recognize differences in the MSRP; for example, the data 
distinguish the 2- and 4-door versions of the Honda Accord sedan. We aggregate the characteristics data to match 
the model-based sales data, and calculate four statistical moments of the MPG distribution by vehicle model: 
minimum, maximum, mean and median. We use the mean value to estimate equation (5), but obtain similar results 
using other moments. 
Accounts in the trade press suggest that the first month of the model-year varies somewhat across models in the 
data, particularly in recent years. The data do not allow us to observe the first month directly, but the specification 
that includes vehicle class-month interactions in Section 5.2 partially addresses potential bias that would arise if the 
first month of the model-year were not random. For some models that first enter the market during the sample 
period, it is possible to infer the first month of the model-year based on the first month in which sales are reported to 
Wards. Note that this measure is imperfect because some firms may not report sales of a new model when the sales   15
prevents us from analyzing the relationship between the price of gasoline and vehicle sales in the 
early and middle 1970s. 
Figure 2a shows the real price of gasoline and the sales-weighted average MPG from 1978-
2007, plotting quarterly averages for clarity. Both series vary considerably over time. The price 
of gasoline increased sharply in 1979, coinciding with the major oil shock, and declined 
significantly in the mid 1980s. The price was then relatively stable through the 1990s, before 
increasing from 2002-2007. Average MPG began increasing in the late 1970s and 1980s, as the 
CAFE standard, which took effect in 1978, increased.
10 Fuel economy declined steadily in the 
1990s and remained roughly constant thereafter. Much of the decrease was due to compositional 
changes, particularly the increase in sales of SUVs, which are subject to the lower CAFE 
standard for light trucks. 
Figure 2b shows the log price of gasoline and log average fuel economy after taking first 
differences and removing year and quarter fixed effects. Within-year increases in the price of 
gasoline are associated with increases in the average fuel economy of new vehicles, particularly 
at the beginning and end of the sample; the relationship is much weaker in the intermediate 
period. The model-level estimates of equation (5), discussed in the next section, reflect these 
patterns.  
Table 1 reports several summary statistics. The first two rows of Panel A show the mean and 
standard deviation of the monthly observations of the price of gasoline and model-by-month 
observations of MPG, roughly by decade. The real price of gasoline was lower and varied less in 
                                                                                                                                                             
volume is small, and the first month of the model’s sales in Wards may not be the same as the first month of 
subsequent model-years. However, the results are similar if we use this measure of the first month of the model-
year. 
The 1978 Energy Tax Act required that mileage ratings be reported. Note that a previous version of the paper 
used a fuel economy variable constructed from Wards, rather than the EPA, but the EPA data appear to be more 
accurate; overall, the differences across data sources are quite small. 
10 There is a sharp decline in MPG in January of 1980 because the 1970s data do not include light trucks or imports.   16
the 1990s than in other time periods. The MPG distribution across vehicle models is fairly stable, 
although the share of models with high fuel economy has increased gradually over time, as 
shown in Figure 3. 
The last two rows in Panel A of Table 1 show dollars-per-mile and the log of model sales. 
Panel B shows the standard deviations of these variables after taking first differences, which is 
the transformation used to estimate equation (5). Even though this transformation removes much 
of the variation, considerable variation remains for both variables in all time periods.  
 
4  MAIN RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKET SHARES AND A GASOLINE TAX 
4.1 EFFECT OF THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ON VEHICLE DEMAND OVER TIME 
Table 2 reports the estimate ofα in equation (5). The dependent variable is the log share of sales 
by model and month. The main independent variable is dollars-per-mile, defined as the real price 
of gasoline divided by the fuel economy of the model, in MPG. The specification includes time 
dummies and model-year interactions. The parameters are estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS). The first row of column 1 reports the estimate ofα , the coefficient on dollars-per-mile. 
Standard deviations are shown in parentheses, clustered by model. The estimate is -12.71 with 
standard error 2.58, which is significant at the one percent level. 
The autocorrelation function of the residuals from this specification indicates significant 
serial correlation, however. For that reason, column 2 reports a first-differenced specification of 
equation (5). The point estimate ofα is similar, -10.55, and is again significant at the one percent 
level. All remaining specifications reported in the paper transform the variables by taking first 
differences.   17
To interpret the magnitude ofα reported in column 2, consider the 2003 Acura CL (23 MPG) 
and the 2003 Volkswagen Jetta (32 MPG). Our estimate implies that a one dollar increase in the 
price of gasoline would reduce sales of the Acura by about 12 percent compared to sales of the 
Jetta.  
While our primary interest is in explaining the trends shown in Figure 1 as well as estimating 
the effect of the gasoline tax on average fuel economy, we first assess whetherα has changed 
over time. If it has, we would restrict our sample to the most recent time period to answer the 
questions of interest; alternatively, ifα has been fairly stable, using a longer sample period would 
increase the efficiency of the estimate. Figure 4 shows the results of estimating a separateα  for 
each model-year. The figure plots the 5-year moving average of the estimates with 95-percent 
confidence intervals indicated by the dashed lines. Several conclusions can be drawn from the 
figure. First, there are two time periods, from 1978-1983 and 2003-2007, in whichα is negative 
and statistically significant. Second, during the intervening years, the estimates are close to zero 
but are volatile and the standard errors are much greater. The pattern suggests that it is difficult 
to estimate the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy when the price of 
gasoline is low or stable. This difficulty may explain the differing conclusions in the literature 
noted in the Introduction. 
Column 3 of Table 2 reports a specification that demonstrates more succinctly the changing 
pattern of consumer responsiveness to the price of gasoline over time. The sample period is 
separated into five six-year intervals, beginning in 1978. The table reports the interaction of 
dollars-per-mile with a set of time period dummies. Note that there is no omitted time period in 
this specification, so each coefficient should be interpreted as the response during the 
corresponding period. The results suggest that consumer demand responds to the price of   18
gasoline when the price is high or increasing, i.e., in the late 1970s/early 1980s and in the 2000s. 
In fact, the response turns out to be quantitatively similar during these times.
11 The price of 
gasoline had a negligible effect on sales when it was low and relatively stable in the intervening 
years. As in Figure 4, the coefficient estimate is weakly positive in the early 1990s, but the 
magnitude is smaller than in the first and last periods and the standard errors are much larger.
12 
Because we are interested in understanding recent changes in market shares and the effect of a 
future increase in the gasoline tax, in the remaining analysis we restrict the sample to the most 
recent time period (2002-2007). This specification is reported in column 4, and is considered the 
baseline in the following discussion.  
 
4.2  EFFECT OF THE PRICE OF GASOLINE ON MARKET SHARES OF U.S. FIRMS AND SUVS 
Between August of 2002 and August of 2007 the real price of gasoline increased from $1.75 to 
$2.86 per gallon. During the same time period, the market share of small SUVs increased from 
7.5 to 17.3 percent, while the market share of large SUVs decreased from 18.3 to 12.0 percent. 
At the same time, market shares of U.S. manufacturers, which rely on sales of large vehicles, 
declined by 20 percent. It is unclear, though, how much of the changes in market shares is related 
to the change in the price of gasoline. 
                                                 
11 It is possible that the CAFE standard biases the results. A permanent increase in the price of gasoline would relax 
the constraint imposed by the standard because consumers would shift towards vehicles with high fuel economy. 
Firms may respond by reducing the relative prices of vehicles with low fuel economy, which would mitigate the 
effect of the gasoline price increase on sales. The dampening effect may be larger in the first time period, when the 
CAFE standards were first phased in, than in the more recent period. We use a reduced form approach to address 
this possibility. Vehicle type distinguishes cars from light trucks. Because the standards apply at the firm-type-year 
level, we estimate a specification that includes firm-type-month interactions. The results of this exercise are nearly 
identical to the reported results.  
12 Small and Van Dender (2007) and Hughes et al. (2008) provide evidence that the short and long run own price 
elasticity of gasoline consumption has decreased in magnitude over the past 30 years. The elasticity can be 
decomposed into three effects: the elasticity of miles travelled with respect to the gasoline price; the price elasticity 
of the size of the vehicle stock; and the price elasticity of the average fuel economy of the stock. The results reported 
in Small and Van Dender (2007) indicate that the decrease in the own price elasticity of consumption is due to a 
decrease in the price elasticity of miles traveled. The results in our paper are thus not inconsistent with the previous 
studies.   19
To answer this question we compare the actual market shares of vehicle models at the end of 
the sample with counterfactual markets shares, which would have occurred had the price of 
gasoline remained constant at the 2002 levels. Because the econometric model is static, the 
counterfactual market shares are computed by estimating the change in sales from their observed 
levels in August of 2007, assuming the price of gasoline was $1.75 instead of $2.86. 
Counterfactual market shares equal the ratio of counterfactual sales to the sum of counterfactual 
sales of models in the market. The central assumption is that the estimated value ofα is an 
unbiased estimate of the true effect at the end of the sample, which may not be valid if the 
coefficient varies over time or as a function of vehicle or consumer characteristics or the price of 
gasoline.
 Although α may vary over time, Figure 4 shows that the estimate ofα is uniformly 
negative within a fairly narrow band from 2002-2007. More importantly, Section 5 reports that 
the estimate is insensitive to controlling for variables that might causeα to vary, such as income 
or substitution to used vehicles caused by changes in the price of gasoline. Note that the main 
conclusions are quite similar using estimates obtained from other econometric models (section 
5.1) as well as adding additional control variables (section 5.2).  
We find that the increase of $1.11 per gallon caused nearly half of the decrease in the market 
share of large SUVs, but much less of the increase in the market share of small SUVs.
13 In 
calculating the effect of the price increase on the market share of U.S. automakers, we find that 
half of its decline can be explained by the increase in the price of gasoline. We conclude that the 
price of gasoline has a substantial effect on the new vehicles market, although perhaps smaller 
than some analysts have recently suggested. 
                                                 
13 The price of gasoline affects sales in relation to the difference between a vehicle model’s fuel economy and the 
average fuel economy in the sample. The smaller effect on small SUVs is due to the fact that the fuel economy of 
small SUVs is similar to the average fuel economy of models in the sample. A change in the price of gasoline 
therefore has a small effect on the market share of small SUVs.    20
4.3  EFFECT OF A GASOLINE TAX INCREASE ON AVERAGE FUEL ECONOMY 
We now relate our model to the economic policy issue of reducing gasoline consumption. The 
public debate has focused on raising the CAFE standard, a command-and-control type regulation 
that applies to new vehicles sold. Many economists, however, have argued that raising the 
gasoline tax instead would be a more efficient way of reducing the consumption of gasoline. A 
welfare comparison of the two policies depends partly on consumer demand for fuel economy 
(Austin and Dinan, 2005). Equation (5) estimates precisely this. 
We use the estimate ofα to calculate the change in average fuel economy of new vehicles 
due to a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline, starting from the fuel economy observed in 
August of 2007. The first column of Table 3 reports the difference between the counterfactual 
and actual sales-weighted MPG for the baseline specification in column 4 of Table 2. The 
standard error is reported in parentheses, calculated using the delta method.
14 The estimate 
ofα implies that a one dollar price increase would raise average fuel economy by 1.08 MPG, 
which is significant at the one percent level. The elasticity of average fuel economy with respect 
to the price of gasoline is therefore about 0.12, which is roughly one-half of that reported by 
Austin and Dinan.  
 
5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1 ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION MODELS 
As noted above, equation (5) includes several functional form assumptions. Columns 2 and 3 of 
Table 3 report the estimated effect of a one dollar price increase on average fuel economy using 
alternate estimation models that relax the main functional form assumptions in equation (5).  
                                                 
14 We assume that actual market shares are measured without error, and that the only uncertainty arises from 
sampling variation overα . The standard errors are computed by taking the first order approximation of the mean 
market share, which is a nonlinear function ofα .   21
Equation (5) was specified under the assumption that dollars-per-mile has the same effect on 
sales for each vehicle. By comparison, random coefficients logit models, such as BLP, allow for 
a separate i α for each consumer. In that case, the effect of dollars-per-mile on the sales of a 
particular model is the mean i α , weighted by the probability individuals purchase the specific 
model. Consequently, there is a separate j α for each model. Researchers commonly assume that 
j α is normally distributed and estimate the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. Our 
data include sufficient observations to simply estimate a separate jy α for each model-year in 
equation (5) using observations from 2002-2007. Figure 5 plots a histogram of the estimated 
coefficients, which indicates some heterogeneity, but shows that most coefficients fall between   
-5 and -30. Column 2 in Table 3 uses the estimated coefficients from this specification to 
estimate that a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline increase raises average fuel economy 
by 1.20 MPG. This effect is significant at the 5 percent level and is quite similar to the baseline 
estimate shown in column 1. 
Finally, we estimate an aggregate regression that characterizes the effect of the price of 
gasoline on average fuel economy: 
t y m
g
t t P MPG ω τ μ δ + + + = ln ln          ( 7 )  
The dependent variable is the log of the monthly sales-weighted average MPG of all new 
vehicles and the first independent variable is the log monthly price of gasoline. The regression 
includes month and year dummies and the coefficientδ is the elasticity of average MPG to the 
price of gasoline. The advantage of this specification is thatδ is simple to interpret, as a linear 
approximation to the effect of the price of gasoline on average MPG. On the other hand, the 
results cannot be used to answer questions pertaining to the effect of the price of gasoline on   22
market shares of U.S. automakers and SUVs. Nevertheless, using observations from 2002-2007, 
we estimate equation (7) for comparison with the results reported earlier and with the previous 
literature. The estimate ofδ is 0.063 with standard error 0.015, which is significant at the one 
percent level. It implies that a one percent increase in the price of gasoline raises average fuel 
economy by 0.06 percent. A one dollar increase in the price of gasoline raises average fuel 
economy by 0.51 MPG (column 3 of Table 3), which is smaller than many estimates in the 
literature. 
 
5.2 ADDITIONAL SPECIFICATIONS 
The preceding sections have documented a strong relationship between the price of gasoline and 
consumer demand for fuel economy. We report several additional specifications that address 
potential omitted variables bias. 
The motivation for using dollars-per-mile as a measure of fuel costs is that under a random 
walk assumption, the current price of gasoline is proportional to expected fuel costs. We can 
relax this assumption for part of the sample period by using the 6-month crude oil futures price 
instead of the current price of gasoline. The results are reported in column 1 of Table 4, and 
show that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The 
smaller magnitude reflects the greater volatility of the variable during the sample period; using 
the results from this specification, the implications for the effect of the price of gasoline on  
market shares turn out to be similar to the baseline specification. 
The baseline specification uses the seasonally adjusted price of gasoline. We view this as the 
appropriate measure because consumers are not likely to treat all price increases equally; for 
example, the price of gasoline tends to be higher during the summer months than during other   23
months and a price increase between spring and summer is not necessarily a signal of an increase 
in the future price. As a robustness check, column 2 uses the actual real price of gasoline rather 
than the seasonally adjusted price. The results are nearly identical to the baseline. 
In the baseline specification we assume that dollars-per-mile is exogenous to other time-
varying determinants of sales, including consumer characteristics. Sufficiently detailed data are 
not available to control for these variables. However, if the distribution of consumer 
characteristics were correlated with dollars-per-mile, it is likely that the omitted variables would 
be correlated among vehicles that belong to the same market segment. For example, if large and 
wealthy families tend to purchase vehicles in the winter, market shares of all SUVs would 
probably be greater in the winter.  
We provide evidence supporting the exogeneity assumption in columns 3-5. Interactions of 
time with the model’s market segment are included in these specifications, using alternative 
definitions of market segments. Column 3 separates models into fuel economy quintiles, and 
columns 4 and 5 use the vehicle market class definitions in Wards to construct 8 aggregate 
classes (small cars, medium cars, etc.). Column 4 includes the interaction of the market class 
with the calendar month and column 5 includes a full set of market class-time interactions. These 
specifications control for time- and market segment-varying consumer characteristics, including 
seasonal patterns and variables that drive the transaction price profiles observed by Copeland et 
al. (2007) and Corrado et al. (2006) In the three reported specifications, the main estimate is 
close to the baseline, although it is smaller in column 5. We conclude that the only threat to the 
empirical strategy would be an omitted variable that has a large effect on sales, yet is weakly 
correlated within a market segment. The robustness to alternative definitions of market segments 
suggests that this is unlikely.   24
6 CONCLUSION 
This paper estimates the effect of the price of gasoline on the demand for fuel economy. The 
empirical strategy combines time series variation of the price of gasoline with cross-sectional 
variation of fuel economy, exploiting the fact that the effect on fuel costs of a given price change 
is inversely proportional to fuel economy. We control for unobserved characteristics that vary by 
model-year by using monthly sales and gasoline price data, combined with model-year fixed 
effects. We find the price of gasoline to have a significant effect on the demand for fuel 
economy. Our estimates imply that the increase in the price of gasoline from 2002-2007 explains 
much of the change in the market shares of large SUVs and of U.S. automakers. Turning to the 
policy question of using the gasoline tax to reduce fuel consumption, an increase in the Federal 
gasoline tax that raises the price of gasoline by one dollar would raise the average fuel economy 
of new vehicles by about 0.5-1 MPG. This result implies that fuel economy would increase only 
modestly under recently proposed caps on greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S., which are 
expected to cause the price of gasoline to increase by considerably less than one dollar per gallon 
by 2030 (U.S. EPA, 2009). 
This study, as well as previous empirical work, uses a static approach in which the set of 
vehicle models is fixed. Furthermore, most of the literature to date only considers short run 
responses by automakers, dealers and consumers. However, the price of gasoline and regulations 
such as CAFE may also have long run effects, for example, if firms respond by offering vehicles 
with different fuel economy. Further work should consider a dynamic setting, in which vehicle 
characteristics and production decisions are endogenous. 
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Figure 1: Changes in Market Shares of U.S. Firms and SUVs and 
Gasoline Prices, 2002-2007
U.S. Firms Smal SUVs Large SUVs Price
Notes: U.S. firms include Chrysler, Ford and GM. Small sport utility vehicles (SUVs) include crossover utility 
vehicles, and large SUVs include all other SUVs. The figure plots the change in the log quarterly average of the 





































Figure 1: Changes in Market Shares of U.S. Firms and SUVs and 
Gasoline Prices, 2002-2007
U.S. Firms Smal SUVs Large SUVs Price
Notes: U.S. firms include Chrysler, Ford and GM. Small sport utility vehicles (SUVs) include crossover utility 
vehicles, and large SUVs include all other SUVs. The figure plots the change in the log quarterly average of the 
real gasoline price and market shares of U.S. firms and SUVs, relative to the first quarter of 2002. The real price 
of gasoline is computed from the BLS and market shares are computed from Wards Auto. See Section 3 for 
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Figure 2a: Quarterly Average MPG and Gasoline Prices, 1978-2007
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Figure 2a: Quarterly Average MPG and Gasoline Prices, 1978-2007
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Figure 2b: First Differences, 1978-2007
Average MPG Price (right axis) 
Notes: Average miles per gallon (MPG) is the sales-weighted average MPG by year and quarter. Figure 2a 
plots average MPG from model-year 1978-2007, and Figure 2b plots the residual of the log of average MPG, 
after taking first differences and removing annual means and quarter fixed effects. The real price of gasoline is 
the price of unleaded gasoline divided by the consumer price index, using the national average gasoline price 
and the consumer price index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The CPI is normalized to one for April,
2008. Figure 2a plots the real price of gasoline, in 2008 dollars, and Figure 2b plots the residual of the log real 























Figure 3: MPG Distribution in 1980 and 2007
1980 2007
Notes: The figure plots a histogram of MPG of vehicles in the Wards database in the indicated years. 
The vertical axis is the share of models with positive sales for the corresponding year. The horizontal 
























Figure 3: MPG Distribution in 1980 and 2007
1980 2007
Notes: The figure plots a histogram of MPG of vehicles in the Wards database in the indicated years. 
The vertical axis is the share of models with positive sales for the corresponding year. The horizontal 
axis labels the maximum fuel efficiency of vehicles in the bin.25
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Figure 4: Coefficient by Model-Year, 1978-2007
Notes: The solid line is the 5-year moving average of the estimated coefficient on dollars-per-mile from 





















Figure 4: Coefficient by Model-Year, 1978-2007
Notes: The solid line is the 5-year moving average of the estimated coefficient on dollars-per-mile from 
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Figure 5: Histogram of Coefficients on Dollars-Per-Mile by Model-
Year
Notes: Figure 5 reports a histogram of the estimated coefficients from equation (5) with a separate coefficient 
on dollars-per-mile for each model-year. The sample, dependent variable and other independent variables 
are the same as in column  4 of Table 2. The histogram shows the number of models for which the estimated 
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Figure 5: Histogram of Coefficients on Dollars-Per-Mile by Model-
Year
Notes: Figure 5 reports a histogram of the estimated coefficients from equation (5) with a separate coefficient 
on dollars-per-mile for each model-year. The sample, dependent variable and other independent variables 
are the same as in column  4 of Table 2. The histogram shows the number of models for which the estimated 














Notes: Cells in Panel A report means with standard deviations in parentheses across observations in the 
indicated model-years. The first row of Panel A reports the monthly real gasoline price, computed as in Figure 2. 
The second row reports the average MPG of all models sold in the indicated decade. The third row reports 
dollars-per-mile, defined as the ratio of the price of gasoline to MPG. The fourth row reports log monthly sales by 




Panel A: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Panel B: Standard Deviations After First Differencing













Model-years in Sample 1978-2007 1978-2007 1978-2007 2002-2007
Number of Observations 71,192 64,671 64,671 15,810
R
2 0.94 0.02 0.02 0.02
First Differences? No Yes Yes Yes
Table 2:
Effect of the Price of Gasoline on New Vehicle Sales, 1978-2007
Dollars-Per-Mile
Dependent Variable: Log Share of Sales
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by model. The table reports the results of estimating 
equation (5) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The dependent variable is the log share of sales by model and 
month. All variables are in first differences in columns 2-4. All specifications include month dummies and 
column 1 includes model-year interactions. Columns 1, 2 and 4 report the estimated coefficient on dollars-per-
mile, which is constructed as in Table 1. Column 3 reports the interaction of dollars-per-mile with a set of 





Dollars-Per-Mile x 2002-2007(1) (2) (4)
1.08 1.20 0.51
(0.19) (0.59) (0.12)
Specification Column (4) of Table 2
Column (1), with Separate 
Coefficient by Model-Year
Equation (7)
Notes: Each column reports the effect of a one dollar increase in the price of gasoline on average MPG. The 
effects are calculated from the indicated specifications, which use observations from model-year 2002-2007. 
Column 1 uses the same specification as column 4 of Table 2. Column 2 uses the same specification as column 
1, except that a separate coefficient on the dollars-per-mile variable is estimated for each model-year. Column 3 
reports the results of estimating equation (7). In columns 1 and 2, the calculation uses the predicted market 
shares of models sold in August, 2007, with and without the price increase. The standard error is in parentheses, 
calculated using the delta method. The effect of the price increase in column 3 is the change in average miles 
per gallon if the price increases by one dollar, relative to the price in August, 2007. 
Table 3:
Effect of a Price Increase on Average Fuel Economy for Alternative Specifications
Effect of One Dollar Price 
Increase on MPG(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-9.39 -16.86 -14.71 -13.37 -10.71
(2.54) (2.08) (2.91) (2.69) (4.43)











15,810 15,810 15,810 15,799 15,799
R
2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06




Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by model. The dependent variable is log market share by 
model and month. The sample is the same as in column 4 of Table 2. Column 1 uses the 6-month futures price 
of crude oil in place of the current price. Column 2 uses the actual gasoline price in place of the seasonally 
adjusted price. Models are assigned quintiles based on their fuel economy. Columns 3-5 report the same 
specification as column 4 of Table 2 but with additional controls. Column 3 includes calendar month-MPG 
quintile interactions. Column 4 includes calendar month- vehicle class interactions. Column 5 includes time-
vehicle class interactions.1 
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